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The Ethics of Governance
Justice Gordon Goodman*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I discuss the need for a board of last resort to set financial
values during periods of extreme economic stress, i.e., the “liquidity black
hole” events discussed below. The purpose of this proposed board, the
“Independent Treasury Board,” would be to address valuation uncertainty
during bust periods immediately following major financial crises.
If an Independent Treasury Board existed prior to 2008, it could have
helped rein in some valuations that were among the causes for the Great
Recession.1 More importantly, it could have quickened recovery from the
Great Recession during the period immediately following the financial crisis
by shortening the period of valuation uncertainty. If created now, the
Independent Treasury Board should become a permanent part of the United
States Treasury Department.

II. LIQUIDITY BLACK HOLE EVENTS
There are many ways to describe liquidity black hole events, below is
one example:
Occasionally, financial markets experience episodes of
turbulence of such an extreme kind that it appears to stop
functioning. Such episodes are marked by a heavily one-sided

* Justice Gordon Goodman serves as a Justice of the Court of Appeals for the First District of
Texas. Before joining the bench in 2019, he served in senior positions for the Howell Corporation; E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co.; Conoco, Inc.; and Occidental Petroleum Corporation. He has worked on
advisory committees for the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the American Petroleum Institute,
and the Energy Oversight Committee. In connection with his advisory work, he has published many
articles on finance, contracts, risk analysis, ethics, and governance. He earned his BA degree magna cum
laude from the University of Pennsylvania and his JD degree from the University of Pennsylvania Law
School both in Philadelphia. He received his high school diploma from the Horace Mann School in the
Bronx, NY.
1. See Robert C. Pozen, Is It Fair to Blame Fair Value Accounting for the Financial Crisis, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 2009); John Weinberg, The Great Recession and its Aftermath, FEDERAL RES. HIST.
(Nov. 22, 2013).
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order flow, rapid price changes and financial distress on the part
of many of the traders. The 1987 stock market crash is perhaps the
most glaring example . . . Practitioners dub such episodes as . . .
“liquidity black holes.”2
Though other financial risks, such as price and credit risk, may be better
known to the public, liquidity risk presents the most profound systemic risk
to our financial systems. A simple way of thinking about liquidity is to
compare it with the physical concept of buoyancy. Buyers in the marketplace
exert upward pressure on financial instruments, while sellers provide
downward pressure. When buyers exit a market due to overvaluations
towards the end of a boom period, even the smallest downward pressure from
sellers can drive values below normal levels, thus creating a “bust.”

III. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE GREAT RECESSION
In an earlier article that I wrote on liquidity risk,3 I noted that the
collateral, or liquidity, provisions contained in almost every over-the-counter
financial industry contract (including swaps, options, and derivatives of all
kinds) have hard collateral triggers that can cause unintended consequences
during periods of extreme financial stress. All such unregulated contracts
require one of the parties to set the “fair value” for these financial
instruments, a process that becomes difficult when markets dry up since most
valuations rely upon recent, arms-length, comparable transactions.
I have also previously written about techniques that may be available to
predict future financial collapse events.4 In July 2007, I published an article
in which I noted that a form of measurable credit risk had fallen to “zero”
probability, and since it could not fall any further, credit risk would
inevitably have to be corrected by going back up.5 Though I was accurate in
making this particular prediction, the ability to forecast financial crises
accurately is limited.

2.

Stephen Edward Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity Black Holes, COWLES FOUND. FOR RES.
YALE UNIV., Discussion Paper No. 1434 (Sept. 2003).
3. Gordon E. Goodman, Liquidity Risk Management: Where the Bucks Stop, GARP RISK REVIEW,
Nov./Dec. 2005, at 11.
4. Gordon E. Goodman, Credit Risk: Will the “Bubble” Burst?, GARP RISK REVIEW, July/Aug.
2007.
5. Id. at 43.
IN ECONOMICS,
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IV. PROFESSOR TAUS AND THE
INDEPENDENT TREASURY SYSTEM
In talking about the risks that can arise from liquidity black hole
events, I note that they are distinct from normal liquidity problems and
seasonal fund flows. As an example of these seasonal flows, the late,
distinguished Professor Esther Taus described the “annual autumnal
stringencies” that arose throughout the 19th century and early 20th
century, which were associated with funding requirements for agriculture
in the southern and western regions of the United States.6 A detailed
analysis of the pragmatic techniques adopted by the U.S. Treasury
Department through its “Independent Treasury System” (a precursor to
the Federal Reserve System) appears in Taus’s comprehensive study of
the central banking functions in the United States.7 The Independent
Treasury System existed from 1846 through 1920.
A revived and repurposed Independent Treasury System, working
with the Federal Reserve System, could serve as a bulwark against
valuation confusion in the days immediately following a financial crisis.
Valuations of last resort by an Independent Treasury Board, backed by a
Sub-Treasury, could provide immediate stability and certainty before
longer term liquidity programs (like the Federal Reserve’s recent
“Quantitative Easing Program,” which covered only a small subset of
financial instruments)8 can begin to repair long-term damage.
Quantitative Easing is a form of unconventional monetary policy under
which central banks purchase “. . . financial assets such as Treasuries or
mortgage-backed securities in an attempt to reduce yield, boost lending,
and stimulate economic activities.”9

6. ESTHER ROGOFF TAUS, CENTRAL BANKING FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TREASURY,
1789-1941 104 (1967). In describing this process, Professor Taus notes: “[b]ut even a slight contraction
in the amount of money available for reserve may have an important effect on the money market,
especially if reserves are near the legal minimum. Contraction (though apparently insignificant in amount)
may contribute to or even produce a money stringency. This in turn may result in a violent reaction in the
general level of price, a disturbance in interbank settlements and disorder in almost every part of business
activity.” Id. at 79.
7. See id. at 85–133 (The Independent Treasury as the Real Central Bank, 1890-1912).
8. See INDRANEEL CHAKRABORTY, ITAY GOLDSTEIN & ANDREW MACKINLAY, MONETARY
STIMULUS AND BANK LENDING (2019), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~itayg/Files?qeb
anklending-forthcoming.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2020).
9. Id. at 2.
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V. EFFORTS TO PROVIDE VALUATION STABILITY IN 2008
From 2007 to 2013, I served on the Financial Accounting Standards
Board’s (“FASB’s”) Valuation Resource Group (the “VRG”), which was
formed as problems in setting the value for certain financial instruments
became apparent. Banks and other companies in the financial industry were
finding it increasingly difficult to identify comparable values for mortgagebacked securities and other exotic financial instruments that were being
bundled and sold at that time.10
Though banks had reverse engineered the process used by major rating
agencies to obtain relatively high ratings for unconventional instruments
versus other more traditional investments, the growing lack of appetite for
these complex instruments, regardless of their ratings, made valuations
problematic. At the VRG, among the many questions we received, was
whether older and less reliable transactions could be used in setting the fair
value for these instruments.
When the crisis finally came to a head with the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy filing in September 2008, the members of the VRG discussed
how best to bring stability back to financial markets. Several members
suggested that a system for setting authoritative fair values (and not just
advisory opinions), often in the absence of recent market transactions, could
be important in restoring investor confidence to markets. This system could
be critical for certain financial instruments that are: (1) subject to fair value
measurement under generally accepted accounting principles (the
“GAAP”);11 (2) subject to reporting requirements in standard financial
reports for public corporations under SEC rules;12 but (3) are not valued
through a regulated exchange.
As a result of these discussions, on September 24, 2008, I along with
another member of the VRG wrote the following letter to the Secretary of
the Treasury Department, Mr. Henry M. Paulson, Jr.:
The undersigned are members of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board’s Valuation Resource Group, which is known as
the ‘VRG.’ We are writing to you today however as individual
10. The structure of the VRG, an advisory board to FASB, composed of leading financial,
accounting, and legal experts, is a possible model for a new Independent Treasury Board.
11. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78m(b)(1) (granting SEC authority to establish GAAP applicable
to financial statements and other documents filed under Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,172 (Dec. 20,
1973) (delegating authority to establish GAAP to Financial Accounting Standards Board).
12. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2) (requiring issuers of securities to file “annual reports” and
“quarterly reports” as prescribed by SEC); 17 C.F.R. Part 230 (setting forth General Rules and
Regulations applicable to annual and quarterly reports).
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valuation experts and concerned citizens. A copy of this note is
being sent to Mr. Robert Herz, the Chairman of FASB, with whom
we have discussed the following proposal to assist Treasury.
On a voluntary basis, we offer to assist Treasury in designing and
implementing an orderly process for valuing certain financial
instruments, which are to be acquired by Treasury under a bill now
pending in Congress. We have had extensive hands-on experience
in calculating the fair value of complex derivative instruments in
addition to our policy work for the VRG.
Please let us know if we can be of assistance to you and
Treasury.13
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the urgency of the crisis, we did not hear
back from the Treasury Department on our offer. As a result, on October 7,
2008, we wrote a follow-up letter to the Secretary in which we offered to
serve on a “Credit Review Committee” that was being discussed at that time.
Though this Committee was authorized to be formed under the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,14 it never came into existence.

VI. CREATION OF A NEW “INDEPENDENT
TREASURY BOARD”
During the current period of relative calm in U.S. financial markets, and
before the next financial crisis occurs, Congress should consider passing a
new Independent Treasury Act that would create a revived Independent
Treasury System. This system should include an Independent Treasury
Board and a Sub-Treasury. The Independent Treasury System would be in
addition to the Federal Reserve System.
The Independent Treasury Board should report to the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Chairman of FASB and be composed of leading financial,
accounting, and legal experts. During nonemergency periods, the
Independent Treasury Board should function like the Valuation Resource
Group did at FASB and provide advisory opinions on complex valuation
questions for investors and creditors. In this role, it should primarily report
to the Chairman of FASB.
13. Letter from the VRG to Henry M. Paulson, Jr. (Sept. 24, 2008) (on file with author).
14. 12 U.S.C. § 5214(f) (“The Financial Stability Oversight Board may appoint a credit review
committee for the purpose of evaluating the exercise of the purchase authority provided under this chapter
and the assets acquired through the exercise of such authority, as the Financial Stability Oversight Board
determines appropriate.”).
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At any time, the Independent Treasury Board should be able to notify
the Treasury Secretary of an impending or existing financial crisis (i.e., an
emergency period). During such emergency periods, the Independent
Treasury Board should report to the Secretary of the Treasury; the opinions
it issues on complex valuation questions for investors and creditors should
be authoritative and set the binding fair value of certain financial instruments
for all purposes both legal and contractual.
Under the new Independent Treasury System, a Sub-Treasury should
also be established and authorized during emergency periods to purchase
certain financial instruments at fair values that have been previously
determined by the Independent Treasury Board. In turn, this Sub-Treasury
should be authorized to sell notes to the public that are guaranteed by these
acquired financial instruments.

VII. CONCLUSION
A liquidity crisis is in many ways a financial manifestation of the
classical concept of chaos and the more modern concept of uncertainty.
During emergency periods, it is less important whether the values of certain
financial instruments are set high or low (so long as they are calculated
rigorously and impartially), but it is critically important that they be set in an
authoritative manner. The lack of knowledge about the value of these
financial instruments during a liquidity crisis and resulting public confusion
are what create most of the long-term economic destruction and not the shortterm financial losses themselves. Having an Independent Treasury Board in
place when emergency periods begin should make future transitions from
crisis back to stability smoother and less problematic for the investing public.

